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Taking   into   consideration   the   extremely   harsh   public   health   conditions   faced   by   the  majority   of   the  
world   population,   the   Health   Impact   Fund   (HIF)   proposal   seeks   to   make   the   intellectual   property  
regimes   more   in   line   with   human   rights   obligations.   While   prioritizing   access   to   medicines   and  
research   on   neglected   diseases,   the   HIF   makes   many   compromises   in   order   to   be   conceived   as  
politically   feasible   and   to   retain   a   compensation   character   that   makes   its   implementation   justified  
solely   on   basis   of   negative   duties.   Despite   that   current   global   health   realities   make   such   steps  
reasonable,   the   paper   looks   up   the   negative   effects   on   one   overlooked   human   right:   the   right   to  
participate  in  scientific  advancement.  
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The  Health  Impact  Fund  (HIF)  is  seen  by  critics  of  
the  intellectual  property  regimes  established  after  the  
TRIPS   agreement   as   an   important   addition   to  make  
the   current   regime  more   compatible  with   the  notion  
of   across-­‐‑the-­‐‑border  human   rights   responsibilities.   If  
we   treat   the   HIF   as   the   single   addition   needed   to  
make   the   regime   more   in   line   with   international  
human   rights   obligation,   especially   as   defined   by  
human   rights   charters   and   further   specified   by  
general   comments   on   the   Covenant   for   Economic,  
Social   and   Cultural   Rights,   some   conflicts   will   still  
remain   unresolved,   especially   the   impact   our  
intellectual   property   regimes   have   on   the   human  
right   to   share   in   the   advancement   of   science  
(Universal   Declaration   of   Human   Rights   (UDHR)  
article  27.1).  
In  order  to  show  how  this  deficit  has  slipped  into  
the  HIF  proposal,   I  will  discuss  the  different  starting  
points   both   discourses   have,   to   wit,   the   access   to  
medicines   debate   and   the   general   criticism   of   the  
intellectual   property   regimes,   thereafter   elaborate  
upon   the   actual   conflict   of   rights   and   finally  discuss  
what   implication   the   current   (and   theoretically   the  
post   HIF)   situation   has   for   human   rights   and   the  
relation  among  people  of  different  nations.    
  
Two  Different  Starting  Points  
The  Health  Impact  Fund  is  a  proposal  that  aims  at  
making   medicines   available   for   the   global   poor.   It  
identifies   three   main   problems   of   why   medical  
innovation   does   not   reach   the   poor:   (1)   drugs   for  
diseases   that   predominantly   affect   the   poor   are   not  
available,   i.e.   the   availability   problem,   (2)   there   is   a  
lack   of   medical   infrastructure   and   (3)   many  
medicines   are   priced   way   out   of   financial   reach   of  
over   half   of   the   world’s   population,   i.e.   the   access  
problem.      For   two   of   those   problems   a   solution   is  
relatively   easily   achievable,   those   are   the   access   and  
availability   problems.1   We   can   have   an   additional  
                                                                                                                            
1   Compared   to   the   huge   costs   of   building   a   public   health  
infrastructure,   those   are   somewhat   easier   tasks   to   solve.  
There   is   also   another   very   important   reason   to   focus   on  
medicines  targeted  for  the  poor:  innovation  in  medicine  that  
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incentive  system  that  will  make  it  profitable  to  invest  
on   research   and   development,   accompanied   by   a  
corresponding   sales   strategy,   aiming   at   having   the  
maximum  impact  on  the  health  of  as  many  people  as  
possible.   The   goal   will   be   maximizing   quality-­‐‑
adjusted  life  years  (QALY),  and  not  the  satisfaction  of  
markets  with  high  purchasing  power,   since   that  will  
dictate   the   size   of   the   award   the   pharmaceutical  
producer   can   claim   from   the   HIF   if   it   decides   to  
choose  for  that  remuneration  method.2  
Thomas   Pogge   has   elaborated   the   moral  
framework  upon  which  the  HIF  is  built  up  on  trying  
to   use   solely   negative   duties:   “While   some  
passionately   reject   such   human-­‐‑rights-­‐‑imposed  
positive  duties  and  others  passionately  endorse  them,  
I  simply  leave  them  aside  here,  without  prejudice.  To  
keep   my   argument   widely   acceptable,   I   conceive  
human   right   narrowly   as   imposing   only   negative  
duties.”3  The  reason  for  doing  so  is  mainly  pragmatic:  
the  HIF  requires  6  billion  dollars  a  year  to  start  up  –  a  
wide   array   of   people   have   to   be   convinced   in   order  
for  the  fund  to  come  into  existence.    
After  a  well-­‐‑argued  and  extensive  criticism  of  the  
current   trade   regime,   encompassing   market   entry  
regulations,   intellectual   property   rights,   recognition  
of   dictators   as   legitimate   persons   to   sell   a   country’s  
resources   and   borrow   vast   sums   of   money   in   their  
peoples’  name,   among  other   issues,  Pogge   rightfully  
asserts   that   today’s   political   order   represents   an  
institutional   harm.   We   are   violating   our   negative  
duty   of   not   imposing   an   oppressive   regime   upon  
other   people.   Further   he   goes   on   with   “[...]   this  
negative   institutional   duty   may   impose   positive  
obligations  on  advantaged  participants:  obligations  to  
compensate   for   their   contribution   to   the   harm.”4  
Under  this   line  of  argument  the  implementation  of  a  
HIF   can   be   understood   as   an   obligation   based   on  
compensation  duties  for  harm  caused.    
Pogge   achieves   this   justification   at   quite   a   high  
price:  
1.   Even   if,   on   utilitarian   terms,   an   injury   with  
compensation   is   better   than   an   injury   without  
compensation,   compensation   is   still   a   remedy  
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
is   publicly   available   is   a   public   good.   Even   though  
medicines   themselves   can   be   scarce,   the   knowledge  
encompassed   in   medical   innovation   is   of   non-­‐‑rivalrous  
consumption   (except   to   some   degree   antibiotics).   This  
means   that   the   resources   spent  on  medical   innovation  will  
not   be   lost   by  wars   or   civil   unrest,   as   commonly   happens  
with  public  health  infrastructure.    
2  Hollis  and  Pogge  [2008].  
3  Pogge  [2010],  p.  28.  
4  Pogge  [2010],  p.  52.  
for  a  harm  that  should  not  have  come  into  being  
in   the   first   place.   We   are   compensating   while  
harming.   The   HIF   is   an   option   for   more  
conscious   governments   to   counteract   the  
negative   influence   the   global   regime   that   they  
are  co-­‐‑maintaining  has  –  in  itself,  the  drafters  of  
the  fund  have  to  accept  that  there  is  not  enough  
good  will   to   change   the   current   status   quo   and  
content   itself   in   being   hugely   beneficial   for   the  
poor   people   of   the   world,   while   remaining   a  
partial  solution.  
If   rewards   are   necessary   to   make   the   system  
more   efficient   in   bringing   out   new   or   more  
efficacious  medicines,  we  have   to  keep   in  mind  
that   incentive   systems   other   than   the   current  
patent   regime   are   conceivable5      –  whether   they  
are  also  political  feasible  and  more  cost-­‐‑effective  
is   something   that   stands   a   different   moral  
evaluation.  A   conceivable   incentive   system   that  
is   more   human   rights   compatible,   but   much  
more   difficult   to   realize,   cannot   be   on   moral  
grounds  completely  discarded  by  advocating  for  
a  more   feasible  but   less   compatible   system.  We  
as   citizens   of   democracies   can   still   be   held  
morally  accountable  for  a  huge  collective  action  
problem.  
This   does   not   nevertheless   excuse   us   from  
remaining   in   inaction.   We   as   individuals   still  
have   the   moral   obligation,   if   doing   so   saves  
lives,  to  make  compromises  and  settle  for  partial  
solutions  until  greater  consensus  can  be  reached.  
However   there   is   still   a   big   argumentative   gap  
to  be  filled,  in  order  to  be  able  to  call  the  HIF  an  
incentive  system  that  is  the  “most  advantageous  
permissible  regime”  for  the  affluent6,  especially  if  
this   group   is   shaping   the   rules   of   the   game   of  
what  counts  as  politically  feasible  and  what  not.  
Patents   are   not   the   only   possible   conceivable  
system  of  incentives  and  therefore  not  a  fixed  or  
indispensable   constraint   for   shaping   future  
orders.   The  moral   evaluation   of   the  HIF   has   to  
take   a   theoretical   world   with   a   completely  
different   incentive   system   as   a   comparison   and  
not   only   the   post   or   pre   Trade   Related  
Intellectual   Property   Rights   (TRIPS)   agreement  
world.  
2.   Obligations   to   compensate   address   very  
limited  positive  duties.  
This   is   the   moral   basis   for   the   HIF.   Let   us   turn   to  
criticism  of  the  intellectual  property  regime.    
                                                                                                                            
5  We  can   think  of  a  prize   system   like   the  one  proposed  by  
Love  and  Hubbard  [2007].    
6  Pogge  [2009],  p.  551.  
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The   criticism  of   the   intellectual   property   regimes  
as   established   after   the   TRIPS   agreement   does   not  
start   from   the   same   starting   point   as   the  
consideration  made  by  the  precursors  of  the  HIF.  As  
an   example  we   can   state   the  position  my   colleagues  
and   I   have   taken   to   the   issue.7   Building   up   on   the  
work   of  Matthew   DeCamp,8   we   state   that   there   are  
three   distributive   effects   an   intellectual   property  
regime  has,   those  are   (a)  availability,   (b)  distribution  
of   IP   rights   and   (c)   access.   This   criticism   does   not  
concentrate  on  a  particular  issue,  like  benefiting  from  
the   advancement   of   medicine   while   targeting   a  
particular  human  right,  i.e.,  the  right  to  health,  but  on  
the   conflicts   the   intellectual   property   regime   might  
pose  to  the  fulfilment  of  human  rights  in  general.  
Our   group   does   defend   the   existence   of   positive  
duties.   Innovation   does   have   a   huge   potential   to  
positively  (and  also  negatively)  affect  the  provision  of  
human  rights.  Securing  human  rights  demands  both  
negative   and   positive   duties,   as   some   communities  
will   have   a   too   hard   time   to   fulfil   human   rights   for  
their   people   on   their   own.   Taking   here   personally   a  
more  radical  direction,  I  believe  that  human  rights  are  
indivisible   and   should   be   protected   as   a   whole   at  
least  up   to  a  minimum  threshold,  much   in   line  with  
Cristina   Lafont.9   We   should   not   advocate   the  
fulfilment  of  one  human  right  at   the  cost  of  another,  
nor   secure   rights   only   selectively.   Some   often-­‐‑
neglected   human   rights   are   essential   for   human  
flourishing   and   to   strengthen   human   capabilities.10  
One  of  such  capabilities  I  find  central  is  the  capability  
to  provide  technical  solutions  for  society’s  problems,  
based   on   the   freedom   to   make   use   of   one’s   mental  
faculties  and  to  be  able  to  care  for  one’s  cohabitants.11  
Therefore   every   society   should   be   able   to   provide  
innovations   and   this   liberty   should   not   be   reserved  
for   a   particular   section   of   the   world,   nor   seen   as   a  
luxury.   Having   this   freedom   comes   with   many  
practical   advantages,   advantages   that   are   seen   by  
some   schools   of   thought   as   prerequisites   for   a  well-­‐‑
functioning   society,   in   this   case   a   much   broader  
scientific   participation   and   therefore   (at   least  
potentially)   a   more   inclusive   deliberation   on   the  
effects   of   scientific   innovation   to   society.   Respecting  
                                                                                                                            
7  Korthals  [2010];  Timmermann  and  Belt  [forthcoming].  
8  DeCamp  [2007].  
9  Lafont  [2011a];  Lafont  [2011b].  
10   Cf.   Nussbaum   [1997]   and   particularly   in   relation   to  
UDHR  article  27,  see  Timmermann  [2012].  
11   Even   though   for   the   later   one   I   take   a   wider  
interpretation,   those   two   capabilities   can   be   found   on  
Martha  Nussbaum’s  human  capabilities  list,  see  Nussbaum  
[2006].  
the   human   right   to   share   in   the   advancement   of  
science   implies   a   serious   intention   of   capacity-­‐‑
building,   something   that   would   be   quite   hard,   or  
impossible,   to   argue   on   the   basis   of   solely   negative  
duties.  
We   can   briefly   summarize:   the   HIF   concentrates  
in  developing  and  providing  medicines  for  the  poor,  
while   the  criticism  of   the  IP  regime  is   looking  for  an  
overall  solution  to  counter  the  negative  effects  of  the  
current  status  quo  on  human  rights  in  general.  
For   constructive   criticism,   we   need   to   ask  
ourselves   what   the   possible   negative   effects   on  
human   rights   are   of   advocating   singlehandedly   for  
the  HIF.    
  
The  Life  Sciences  and  intellectual  Property  Rights  
The  HIF  allows  its  users  to  retain  their  intellectual  
property  rights.  This  has  been  severely  criticized,  and  
is  a  point  I  will  elaborate  upon  in  this  section.  
Intellectual  property   rights   in   the   life   sciences  do  
not  only  allow   its  holders   to  keep   competitors   away  
from   producing   the   same   products   for   commercial  
purposes,   but   in   many   cases   can   constrain   the  
research  other  companies  can  make  in  that  area.  Fine  
distinctions,  as   for  example  on  a   research  exemption  
counting   for   research   on   the   object,   but   not   on  
research  with   the   object,   are   in   the   life   sciences   not  
very  clear,  a  fuzziness  of  which  the  company  that  can  
threaten   infringements   suits   more   credibly   can  
benefit   on   a   much   higher   level   than   smaller  
companies.   This   situation   is   aggravated   by   not  
having   clear   boundaries   of   where   one’s   property  
begins  and  other  people’s  property  end.12  
Analysing   the   differences   of   tangible   property  
rights   regimes   in   the   developed   and   the   developing  
world,  Hernando  de  Soto  came  to  the  conclusion  that  
one  of   the  main  causes   for  being   trapped   in  poverty  
was  the  inability  to  get  loans  granted  due  to  not  being  
able   to   prove   concrete   property   titles   as   a   guaranty  
for   investors.13   Patents   in   the   life   sciences   are  
exclusive   rights   titles   over   a   quite   uncertain   area.14  
When  a  start-­‐‑up  company  has  only  a  few  patents  (or  
the  promise   thereof)   it   offers   a   quite  weak   collateral  
                                                                                                                            
12   A   general   remark   on   this   issue   is   offered   by   Eisenberg  
[2008].  
13   Soto   [2000].   My   interpretation   of   de   Soto   has   been  
strongly  influenced  by  Riles  [2011].  
14  This  problem  is  not  limited  to  the  life  sciences,  cf.  Bessen  
and   Meurer   [2008,   chap.3]   before   describing   a   series   of  
conflict  cases  in  different  technology  areas,  state:  “[a]n  ideal  
patent   system   features   rights   that   are  defined  as   clearly  as  
the   fence   around   a   piece   of   land.   Realistically,   no   patent  
system  could  achieve  such  precision…”  (idem,  p.  46).  
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to  future  investors.  A  bigger  company  can  spread  the  
risk  of  not  being  able  to  provide  a  clearance  of  rights  
at  a  later  stage  of  its  research,  while  at  the  same  time  
having   a  much   bigger   patent   portfolio   to   counteract  
infringement  threats  of  competitors  and  being  able  to  
afford   a   much   larger   department   of   business  
intelligence   with   the   corresponding   intellectual  
property   experts.   Those   are   multiple   factors   that  
favour  bigger  players.  
There   is   also   a   concern,   that   today’s   intellectual  
property  regimes  do  not  only  fail  to  foster  but  might  
even   endanger   the   co-­‐‑existence   of   other   ways   of  
promoting   innovation.15   When   seeking   exclusive  
rights   becomes   predominant,   it   will   be   difficult   for  
groups  to  maintain  other  traditional  ways  in  bringing  
out   innovations,   especially   those   that   are   based   on  
loose   systems   of   reciprocal   sharing,   as   with   seed-­‐‑
exchange  practices  by  small-­‐‑scale  farmers.  Further,  if  
exclusive   rights,   especially   patents,   are   held   by   a  
small  group  of  people,  the  decision-­‐‑making  power  to  
shape   further   innovations   and   achieve   considerable  
market   shares   is   reserved   to   this   group.16   This  
tendency   goes   in   two   ways   against   the  
democratization   of   science,   it   endangers   diversity   in  
innovation   processes   and   it   concentrates   decision-­‐‑
making  of  what  targets  are  worthwhile  to  pursue  and  
to   be   placed   as   products   on   the   market   to   a   small  
privileged  group.17  
As  an  additional  factor,   the  overlapping  property  
claims   in   patents   play   a   significant   role.   This   is  
especially   a   problem  when   broad  patents   are   issued  
on  newer  promising  molecules  or  genes.18  When  such  
patents  are  issued,  much  of  the  follow  up  research  on  
that   molecule   has   to   seek   freedom-­‐‑to-­‐‑operate   from  
the  original  patent  holder  and  this  under  a  position  of  
very   unequal   negotiation   power.   In  many   cases   this  
cannot   be   fixed   beforehand   by   more   careful   patent  
granting  by  patent  offices,  since  the  importance  of  the  
new   molecule   is   often   seen   after   its   initial  
development.   The   same   counts   for   enabling  
technologies   that   are   shared   among   various  
platforms.  This   is  of   especial   concern   for  developing  
                                                                                                                            
15   On   the   other   hand,   some   open   innovation   models   are  
actually   only   conceivable   with   IP,   as   will   be   discussed  
below.  
16  A   similar   insight   is   offered   by  DeCamp   [2007],   pp.   214-­‐‑
219.  
17   I   would   like   to   thank   Guido   Ruivenkamp   and   Osmat  
Jefferson  for  bringing  this  point  to  my  attention.  
18  A  case  study  offered  by  the  Nuffield  Council  on  Bioethics  
[2002,   p.   41]   briefly   illustrates   how   the   USPTO   granted  
exclusive   rights   over   the   gene   that   codes   for   the   CCR5  
receptor  before  its  role  in  HIV/AIDS  was  known.      
countries,   as   it   will   be   very   difficult   to   establish  
national   innovative   capacities   if  many   research   tools  
are   controlled   by   multinational   corporations   that  
operate   with   much   higher   research   budgets.   Since  
such  situations  might  arise  quite  often  with  research  
on  neglected  diseases,  I  will  elaborate  upon  that  point  
in  the  next  section.  
  
Neglected  Diseases:  an  equal  start?  
Deliberating  on  the  issue  of  neglected  diseases,  an  
area   where   big   pharmaceutical   companies   have  
comparatively   little   expertise,  we  might   come  across  
the   thought   that   concerning   these   diseases   those  
companies   and  developing  world   industry  or  public  
institutions  will  have  roughly  an  equal  start.  
The   moment   the   HIF   is   implemented,   a   huge  
incentive   is   created   for  doing   research   in  previously  
non-­‐‑lucrative   areas   such   as   neglected   diseases.   We  
can   easily   expect   that   the   diseases   that   will   be  
targeted   first,   are   the   ones   affecting   the   greatest  
number   of   people   (thus   receiving   the   highest   pay-­‐‑
offs)  and  that  what  fits  the  metaphor  of  “low  hanging  
fruits.”  
Conceptualizing   such   a   race,   we   might   see   that  
there   are   some   advantages   of   being   closer   to   (or   in)  
the   countries   where   such   diseases   are   prevalent.  
People   might   have   better   samples   of   the   pathogens  
and   access   to   herbal   medicines   developed   by  
indigenous   communities.   The   question   is   for   how  
long  can  that  group  benefit  of  such  a  head  start  if  the  
methods   that   enable   them   to   race,   not   merely   the  
start,  are  so  disproportionally  advantageous  for  only  
one  side,  taking  into  account  the  huge  accompanying  
infrastructure   that   saves   time   by   having   the   newest  
machines,  huge  gene  banks,  highly   trained  personal,  
being  able   to  communicate  directly  with  most  of   the  
specialists   in   the   field   and   having   the   possibility   to  
search  through  most  of  the  journals  ever  published?  
Another   issue  of   concern   is   that   the  HIF   requires  
innovation   to  be  protected  by  patents   in  order   to  be  
able   to   apply   for   the   fund’s   rewards.   This   is   very  
much   in   line   with   the   general   trend   of   favouring  
break-­‐‑through   research   at   the   cost   of   small-­‐‑scale  
innovation19  –  a  preference  that  is  questionable  when  
widespread   impact   is   the   central   goal   of   the   fund.20  
                                                                                                                            
19   Relating   this   point,   see   Thompson   [2010]   for   a   brief  
historical   overview   exemplified   by   U.S.   agriculture  
innovation  financing.  
20   There   are   some   discrepancies   towards   what   the   central  
goal  of  the  fund  might  be,  e.g.  Coles  and  Frewer  [2011],  p.  4,  
state:  “it  is  essential  for  the  HIF  to  clarify  whether  it  sees  its  
purpose   primarily   as   a   mechanism   for   encouraging   the  
pharmaceutical   industry   to  develop  products   for  neglected  
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We   cannot   assume   that   an   innovation   that   is   in   the  
public   domain,   i.e.   not   covered   by   patents,   is  
necessarily   dispersed   in   form   of   useful   products  
among   the   world’s   population.21   Cheaper   objects   of  
innovation   or   implementations   thereof,   does   not  
mean   for   free   –   if   no   one   is   being   remunerated   for  
making   those   improvement   possibilities   known,   the  
most  likely  result  is  that  they  will  not  be  passed  on.  A  
strict  concern  for  impact  should  take  also  those  kinds  
of   innovations   into   account   and   foster   their  
implementation;  this  is  of  especial  consideration  if  the  
impact   fund  idea   is   to  be   translated   into  other  areas,  
e.g.   agriculture   or   climate   change   mitigation   and  
adaptation.  
The   preference   for   patented   technologies   has  
serious   global   justice   concerns.   First,   one   of   the  
requirements   of   patentability   is   that   the   invention  
involves   an   inventive   step   (non-­‐‑obviousness).   What  
counts  as  being  non-­‐‑obvious  is  relative  to  the  state  of  
knowledge  to  someone  skilled  in  the  art  at  the  time  of  
patent   application.   Therefore,   an   inventive   step   ten  
years   ago  might  not  be   regarded  as   such  nowadays.  
Being   out-­‐‑dated,   by   having   older   equipment,   no  
access  to  the  newest  literature  and  little  acquaintance  
with  the  most  actual  research  methods,  makes  it  more  
difficult  to  satisfy  the  ‘inventive  step’  criterion  based  
on   the   current   state   of   the   art   (although   it   does   not  
make  it  impossible).  The  invention  might  still  be  able  
to   achieve   a   high   impact   or   have   an   industrial  
application,  but  might  not  survive  the  patent  office’s  
non-­‐‑obviousness   requirement   and   thus   fail   to   be  
covered   by   a   patent,   something   that   is   good   for  
having   more   knowledge   available   in   the   public  
domain,   provided   it   is   not   maintained   as   a   trade  
secret,   but   comes   at   the   expense   of   researchers   of  
primarily  poorer  institutions.  
A   second   concern   has   its   roots   in   the   novelty  
requirement   for   patentability.   The   novelty  
requirements   forbid   to   grant   patents   for   knowledge  
made  previously  public.  In  practice  this  also  comes  at  
a   certain   cost   for   smaller   institutions   that   cannot  
cover   the  costs  of   intellectual  property  protection  on  
their   own   and   are   dependent   on   seeking   for  
investors.   Even   though   non-­‐‑disclosure   agreements  
can  partly  overcome  the  problem,   it   is  quite  difficult  
for  poorer  innovators  to  reach  a  good  deal  if  they  are  
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
diseases   or  whether   it’s   primary   objective   is   to   reduce   the  
global  burden  of  disease.”  
21   The   same   point   is   also   addressed   by   Syed   [2009]  
concentrating  on   the   issue  of  proving  new  medical  uses  of  
known  compounds  and  stating  the  necessity  of  information  
and   innovation   being   “publicly   available   in   a   valuable  
form”  [idem,  p.  10].  
not  allowed  to  make  their  invention  public,  as  trying  
to   convince   another   investor   is   bound  with   risks   of  
misappropriation.  
On   the  other  hand,   the  bar  on  what  can  count  as  
novel  or  non-­‐‑obvious  cannot  be  lowered  for  the  sake  
of   researcher  of   institutions  with   fewer   resources,   as  
it   will   undermine   the   quality   of   patents,   something  
that   will   come   at   the   cost   of   the   whole   scientific  
community.  
To   say   that   the  HIF  would   strengthen   the  divide  
between   technology   receivers   and   technology  
providers  might  be  a  quite  strong  claim,  as  empirical  
evidence   would   still   be   needed.   This   nevertheless  
does  not  prevent  us   from  holding   the   claim   that   the  
HIF  would  be  doing  a  far  better  job  in  alleviating  this  
divide   if   the   strict   requirement   of   patenting   is  
dropped  when  assessing   the   impact  of  a   technology.  
This   would   foster   grass-­‐‑root   innovation,   which   is   a  
first   step   in   closing   up   this   huge   divide.   Sticking   to  
the   patent   prerequisite   makes   the   precursors   of   the  
HIF   debtors   to   an   explanation   of  why   non-­‐‑patented  
high  impact  innovations  are  being  discriminated  even  
when  equally  beneficial  for  public  health.      
  
The  HIF  and  Open  Innovation  
Open   innovation   is   not   only   scientific   research  
minus  patents,  but  a  commitment  of  emphasising  the  
public   good   nature   of   knowledge   and   freedom   in  
science.  Therefore  the  people  that  commit  themselves  
to   open   innovation   see   themselves   as   part   of   a  
different   community,   as   advocates   of   a   movement.  
An   example   of   this   is   the   open   and   free   software  
movement,   one  of   its   forerunners,  Richard  Stallman,  
stated  that  software  should  be  free  as  in  “free  speech,  
not   free   beer,”22   which   means   that   the   importance  
should  be  on   freedom  to  operate,  not  on   freedom  of  
being   sold.   Open   innovation   is   compatible   with  
market  models  although  the  current  patent  system  in  
itself   might   not   be   sufficient   to   make   this   way   of  
doing  science  self-­‐‑sustainable.  
The  HIF   can   play   here   a   key   role,   if   some   slight  
changes   are  made,   something   that   is   of   key   interest  
for  ensuring  the  right  to  share  in  the  advancement  of  
science   and  gaining   support   by   the  open   innovation  
communities.  An  option  lays  not  so  much  for  “pure”  
open   innovation,   but   for   creative   commons   like  
enterprises  or  any  community   that   relies  on  share-­‐‑a-­‐‑
like  licences,  so-­‐‑called  “copyleft”  clauses,  that  rely  on  
intellectual   property   rights   to   keep   others   from  
misappropriating  the  developed  content  and,  in  some  
of   their   variations,   even   follow-­‐‑up   inventions.   The  
                                                                                                                            
22  Quoted  by  Lessing  [2006].    
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community  as  a  whole  can  have  as  a  binding  contract  
that  any  promising  molecule  has   to  be   licensed  only  
to   companies   that   commit   themselves   to   the   HIF.  
Therefore,   using   licenses,   a   commons   group   can  
outsource  clinical  trials  (at  what  level  depends  of  the  
group)   to   a   separate   company   that   specializes   in  
carrying   those   tests   out,   while   having   the   certainty  
that   it   will   not   lose   freedom-­‐‑to-­‐‑operate   and   while  
retaining   the   rights   to   use   the   subcomponents.   The  
refined   research  and  development  on   the  drug   itself  
can   be   made   by   one   of   the   parties   alone   or   as  
collaboration.   The   necessary   incentive   for   the  
company  undertaking   the  clinical   trials   is  created  by  
the  HIF  –  we  can  even  speculate  that  an  especial  new  
branch   of   companies   might   arise.   How   the   reward  
given  by  the  HIF  will  be  shared  among  the  commons  
community  and  the  company  carrying  out  the  clinical  
trials   is   something   those   two   parties   can   decide   on  
their   own.   This   strategy   has   the   potential   to   also  
address   the   issue   of   public   institution   research   and  
the  harvests  thereof.23    
  
Technology  Producers  vs.  Technology  Receivers  
Let   us   start   with   the   claim,   for   the   sake   of   the  
argument,   that  we   could   ensure   access   to  medicines  
more  efficiently  if  only  one  part  of  the  world  does  the  
research  and  development   for  new  medicines   for   all  
the   diseases   in   the   world.   We   could   say   that   any  
attempt   of   building  up   capacities   comes   at   the  price  
of  postponing  access  to  medicines  and  thus  affecting  
a  higher  priority,  which   is   relieving  people   from   the  
agonies   of   diseases.   Public   moral   intuitions   might  
very   well   favour   prioritizing   wide   access   to  
medicines  over  other  projects.  
Although  we  are  very  far  away  of  securing  access  
and  availability  of  medicines  for   the  vast  majority  of  
the  world’s  population,  our  world  is  characterized  by  
having   this   strong  division  of  who   is  providing   and  
who  is  only  receiving  objects  of  medical  innovation.  
Going  back  to  the  argument  of  efficiency,  we  will  
see   that   the   right   to   share   in   the   advancement   of  
science,   to   take   an   example,   goes   into  direct   conflict  
with   the  main   goal   of   ensuring   access   to  medicines.  
Without  resources  for  building  up  infrastructure  and  
having   the   financial   freedom   to   invest   time   in  
research,   most   people   cannot   secure   the   right   to   be  
able   to   share   in   scientific   enterprises.   Again,   we  
might   think   that   this   is   acceptable,   since   drastically  
                                                                                                                            
23  There   are   also  other  prudential   reasons   for  having  more  
transparency   in   drug   testing.   Reichman   [2009]   offers  
extensive  criticism  on  the  conflict  of  interest  that  might  arise  
when   a   pharmaceutical   company   has   to   perform   clinical  
trials.    
more  welfare  is  lost  by  health  hazards.  However  this  
type  of  reasoning  has  a  strong  utilitarian  foundation,  
maximizing   QALY   as   a   main   goal,   to   speak   in   HIF  
terms,   while   relying   strongly   on   the   efficiency  
premise.  
In   order   for   the   efficiency   premise   to   hold,   the  
part   of   the   world   that   is   providing   medicines   does  
have   to   take   into   account   local   varieties   of   the  
diseases   and   develop   medicines   that   take   into  
account   physiological   diversities   and   local  
environmental   interactions24   –   we   might   expect   too  
much  of  philanthropy   if   in   times  of   scarce   resources  
those   communities   that   are  not  providing  medicines  
are  prioritized  or  given  equal  standing.  
Questioning  the  efficiency  premise,  we  start  to  see  
the  price  of  holding   it,   especially  when  we   take   into  
account   the   relatively   low   economic   burden   of  
fostering   capacity-­‐‑building   compared   to   existing  
global  inequalities.  First-­‐‑hand  knowledge  about  local  
environments  becomes  extremely  valuable,  especially  
when   one   can   identify   new   emerging   strains   of   a  
disease  or   the  development  of   resistance   to  drugs  at  
an  initial  stage,  allowing  early  action.  Centralizing  all  
innovation   to   some  points   in   the  world  will   have   to  
deal   with   the   extra   costs   of   getting   all   this   field  
information  in  due  time.  If  doing  the  research  needed  
to   fulfil   the  human   right   to  health   is   taken  as   a   task  
for   which   only   a   particular   group   is   made  
responsible,   we   still   have   to   ask   ourselves   if   other  
groups  are  willing   to  cooperate  by  sharing  any   (also  
not   purely   scientific)   findings   with   this   researching  
group.   To   take   an   example,   we   cannot   expect   that  
tiny  shares  of  benefits  will  ensure  the  cooperation  of  
indigenous   communities   in   making   public   their  
traditional   medicine.   Experience   has   shown   us   that  
people   are   willing   to   forgo   small   benefits   (or   even  
endure   penalties)   by   refusing   to   cooperate   in  
endeavours  they  deem  usurious.25  
This  status  quo  is  also  not  a  relation  among  equals,  
since   societies   with   strict   divisions   of   labour   are  
prone   to   value   one   kind   of   work   higher   than   the  
other,  especially  when  some  work  is  replaceable  or  a  
society   can   do   both   kinds   of   work,   e.g.   providing  
manufactured   products   and   scientific   innovations,  
                                                                                                                            
24  Herewith   I  do  not  want   to  claim  that   local  varieties  play  
always  a  significant  role,  only  that  in  some  cases  they  have  
to   be   taken   into   account.   In   Timmermann   and   Belt  
[forthcoming]   we   elaborate   upon   the   case   of   currently  
available   vaccines   against   HPV   and   their   lack   of  
effectiveness   towards   the   in   developing   countries   widely  
propagated  variant  HPV  35.  
25   An   interdisciplinary   perspective   on   unwillingness   to  
cooperate  is  offered  by  Ooms  [2010],  pp.  609-­‐‑612.  
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while  another  society   is  only  able   to  do  one  of   those  
tasks.   Even   though   recognition   as   equals,   respecting  
human  dignity  at  the  same  level,  might  be  reachable,  
the  desire   to  be   recognized  as   a  peer,26   that   is,   as   an  
irreplaceable   member   of   a   team,   might   remain  
unfulfilled.  
Having   developing   countries   as   production   sites  
for  medicines,  as  might  be   incentivized  by  the  HIF,27  
will  most  likely  bring  some  innovation  possibilities  in  
the   manufacturing   process.   However   this   type   of  
innovation,  although  highly  important,  is  much  more  
constrained   and   does   not   receive   a   similar   public  
appraisal  as  the  identification  of  new  cures.  
  
Conclusions  
Analysing   the  problems  and   consequences  of   the  
highly   unequal   distribution   of   IP   rights   on   a   pure  
rights-­‐‑based   perspective,   without   taking   the  
magnitude   of   current   public   health   inequalities   into  
full  account,  might  lead  to  some  hesitation  to  support  
the  HIF  as  it  is.  However  advocating  for  a  partial,  but  
faster   to   implement   solution   like   the   HIF,   will   save  
lives   until  we   can   implement   a   system  of   incentives  
that   is   more   in   line   with   the   right   to   share   in   the  
advancement  of  science.  The  urgency  of  public  health  
needs   and   the   irreversibility   of   damages   caused   by  
some   diseases   are   good   reasons   to   make   some  
utilitarian  concessions   in  order   to  alleviate   this  huge  
welfare  burden.  
The  drafters  of  the  HIF  should  do  more  work28  in  
making   its   scheme   attractive   for   consortia   working  
under  open  innovation,  since  stimulating  this  kind  of  
innovating  could  encounter  much  of  its  criticism.  
Opponents   of   the  HIF   should   not   forget   that   the  
HIF   could   give   thousands   of   researchers   the  
opportunity   to   work   in   enterprises   that   are   more  
committed   to   have   a   much   wider   impact   on   public  
health   globally.   Here   we   can   reinterpret   the   way  
article  27.2  of   the  UDHR  is   traditionally  understood:  
the   right   to   ensure  moral   interest   resulting   from   an  
invention   does   not   only   have   to   encompass   droits  
d’auteur   but   also,  maybe   even  more   importantly,   an  
ethical   craving   for   one’s   own   inventions   having   an  
increased  role  in  alleviating  the  suffering  of  people  all  
over  the  world.29  
                                                                                                                            
26   Although   in   a   different   context,   I   take   the   concept   of  
“recognition  as  a  peer”  from  Fraser  [1998].  
27  On  this  very  issue,  see  Pogge  and  Hirsch-­‐‑Allen  [2011].  
28  A  very  brief  statement  is  given  in  Anonymous  [2010]  
29  During   the   review  process   of   this   paper,   Thomas  Pogge  
has   brought   to  my   attention   that   the  work   of   Syed   [2009]  
and  Mendel  and  Hollis  [2010]  has  convinced  Incentives  for  
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